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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

Case No. 20150588-CA
LANDIN DEE MOOSMAN,
Appellant is incarcerated.
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
As outlined in the Opening Brief, the errors in this case warrant reversal.
According to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this reply brief is "limited to
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." Utah R. App. P. 24 (c).
Matters not addressed herein were adequately addressed in the Opening Brief.

POINT I.

MR. MOOSMAN PRESERVED HIS OBJECTION TO
THE TRIAL COURT'S PRISON SENTENCE.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
Mr. Moosman to prison for his accidental text message and subsequent apologetic text
messages to the mother of his child. See generally OB.
The state suggests that this Court need not address Mr. Moosman's claim on the
merits as "he has not argued plain error." SB.11 (formatting omitted). Despite Mr.
Moosman' s lengthy argument to the trial court on the reasons supporting probation over
to the state's recommendation of jail, the state feels he failed to preserve his argument on

appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing prison. Id. The state tries to
claim Mr. Moosman is arguing for the first time on appeal the reasons why the trial court
abused its discretion. Id. That claim is without merit and this Court should address Mr.
Moosman's claim on the merits.
Mr. Moosman preserved his objection to the trial court's sentence of prison. He
expressly argued to the sentencing court that it should impose probation, setting forth
facts in the record and arguing therefrom that probation was justified based on: the
probation-order-violations by Ms. Allen (R.74:14-17); the accidental nature of the text
messages (Id. 18-19); that the text messages were non-threatening (Id. 20). He further
supported his claim for probation, stating "AP&P's recommendation for prison is
ridiculous, given what these messages actually are," urging the court that he "deserves a
chance to go back on probation and stop doing stupid things." R.74:20. The state
recognized this as an argument for probation as it suggested to the court that Mr.
Moosman "would do more time in jail," and thus did not "recommend[] prison." R.74:32.
The trial court imposed prison, rejecting the arguments made by Mr. Moosman for
probation. R.74:35-36. This issue was preserved. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan

River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ,r 27, 299 P.3d 990 ("To preserve an issue for
appeal, the party asserting error must (I) specifically raise the issue, (2) in a timely
manner, and (3) support the claim with evidence and relevant legal authority." (quotation
omitted)).
Nor is the state correct that Mr. Moosman's development of this issue on appeal
means it was unpreserved below. SB. IO (suggesting Mr. Moosman "points to no place in
2

the record where he objected that the court was considering irrelevant or unreliable
information or basing its decisions on such information" and therefore that the abuse of
discretion claim is unpreserved). The state forgets that it is always an abuse of discretion
to violate a defendant's due process rights. See OB.7 (trial courts have no discretion to
violate a defendant's dues process right to be sentenced on relevant and reliable
information). Then, it is "[t]he due process clause in both the United States and Utah
Constitutions" that both require "a sentencing judge [to] act on reasonably reliable and
relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." State v. Johnson, 856
P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (quotation omitted). Indeed, it is due process that limits a
trial court's very "exercise of[] discretion" as that discretion "may not be exercised on
the basis of unreliable information." State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1985); see
also State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ,r 34, 282 P.3d 985("we have stated that it is an abuse of
discretion if a district court relies upon irrelevant information to reach its decision"
(citing Howell, 707 P.2d at 117-18)); State v. Bowers, 2012 UT App 353, ,r 12, 292 P.3d
711; United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,447 (1972) (reversing, where the "prisoner
was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record which were
materially untrue" (quotation omitted)). Thus, the basis for Mr. Moosman's claim that the
trial court abused its discretion-by relying on unreliable and irrelevant informationcannot be parsed, rather, it is simply the development of a preserved issue on appeal. See
Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 63, ,r 19,289 P.3d 479 ("this is not a circumstance in which the
appellant has asked us to consider on appeal claims or theories of 'first impression' that
were never presented for decision below"); see also State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ,r,I
3

25-26, 345 P.3d 1168 (a sufficiency challenge in a self-defense case was preserved
although the defendant "did not specifically argue the state failed to meet its burden of
showing that he had not acted in self-defense"); Salt Lake City Corp., 2012 UT 84, iJ 34
(issue preserved although appellant did not "strictly comply with rule 24(a)(5) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure" where appellant "did raise their claim ... and the
district court was aware of their position"); R.C.S. v. A.O.L (In re Baby Girl T.), 2012 UT
78, ,r 37, 298 P.3d 1251 (due process objection preserved where counsel "repeatedly
made due process arguments, although not labeled as such").
Finally, if there is any doubt as to preservation, this Court should be guided by our
courts' liberal approach to procedural rules, favoring addressing an issue on the merits in
order to give litigants their day in court. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,631 (Utah
1983) ("An important legal consequence should not be at the mercy of semantics"); see
also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (issue raised '"indirectly"'

is still preserved when it is '"raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge
can consider it."'); Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 1992) (issue
preserved even though objection not a "textbook example[] of specificity" because it
"adequately directed the trial judge's attention to the claimed error"); State v. Garcia,
2007 UT App 228, il 10, 164 P.3d 1264 (argument relying on "Franks doctrine"
preserved even though State did not formally cite that case but "argued the underlying
premise of the Franks doctrine"); State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, ilil 21-22, 142 P.3d
581 ("counsel's objections ... were sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal" because
policies of judicial economy and fairness were satisfied), ajf'd, 2008 UT 47, 190 P.3d
4

1255; State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, ,r 25 n.4, 37 P.3d 260 (addressing identity
even though not specifically preserved but included in preserved issue).
Mr. Moosman raised this issue to the sentencing court, and that court considered
it. Mr. Moosman's claim is too important to be rejected on the basis of an overly rigorous
application of a procedural rule that would prevent his claim from being considered on
the merits.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON IRRELEVANT AND
UNRELIABLE INFORMATION IN IMPOSING ITS
SURPRISE SENTENCE OF PRISON.
The trial court sentenced Mr. Moosman to prison, which was "a surprise to
everyone," as the trial court based its decision "not at all what anyone has addressed

here," but on what it perceived as "a dynamic[] that is pretty well known in the literature
and in experience, and it is you are indeed a danger to her." R.74:36 (emphasis added).
The state nonetheless suggests it did not rely on "literature and[] experience," but
on the defendant's record. SB.12. To the extent the court should have relied on Mr.
Moosman' s record in sentencing him, the state is correct, but the state is incorrect that the
court actually did so here. The court specified that it imposed prison based "not at all
what anyone has addressed here," which had been the arguments for and against
probation based on the facts of this case and Mr. Moosman' s relationship with Ms. Allen.
R.74:36; see also R.74: 14 (defense counsel discussing "the history between Mr.
Moosman and Ms. Allen"); R. 74:32 (prosecutor stating "I am not recommending prison"
but a year in jail and leaving "it to the Court's discretion whether he is put back on
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probation or not"). Indeed, prior to articulating its sentencing decision, the court was
specific, telling Mr. Moosman why it rejected his arguments:
I understand you [Mr. Moosman] and your lawyer and people in your side
saying, well, this was a text about this. That was a mistake. This text wasn't
a threat. It was just that. But, on the other hand, and I don't claim to be any
kind of expert, but there is a great deal of literature about the simple fact of
not letting go, continued efforts at control, however innocuous they may
seem is very, very dangerous.
R.74:35. The court then used that idea to impose its "surprise" prison sentence. R.74:36.
The trial court was specific about the basis for its prison sentence, and this Court
must take it at its word. State v. Stnmk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300-02 (Utah 1993) (where a
trial court stated the mitigating factors it considered to impose a sentence, it abused its
discretion not to also consider the defendant's age, as demonstrated by court not
including it in its ruling). By its own words, this sentencing court "actually relied on the
specific information in reaching [his] decision and ... the information[] relied upon was
irrelevant." OB.9-12 (quoting Moa, 2012 UT 28, ,r 35). There is therefore a clear record
of "a judge's affirmative representation of reliance." Moa, 2012 UT 28, ,r 35; see also

Howell, 707 P .2d at 117 (concluding trial court relied on information where it specifically
stated at the sentencing hearing that the decision was reached after having "taken into
consideration" the information the defendant's argued was unreliable and irrelevant).
Then, the state tries to defend the court's reliance on "literature" and "experience,"
framing it as having "merely address[ing] what common sense teaches-repeated
violations of the law show an unwillingness to obey the law, and such unwillingness is
dangerous." SB.12. But the state's view of "common sense" does not make it a legal,
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relevant, or reliable basis for a prison sentence, nor does it make this a sentencing
decision that comports with due process. Rather, a sentencing court must rely on
information in sentencing that has "indicia of reliability and [is] relevant in sentencing."

Moa, 2012 UT 28, ,r 36. And reliability is not established by one person's view of
common sense. The court's reliance on a "dynamic[] that is pretty well known in the
literature and in experience" to sentence Mr. Moosman, was simply an inherently
unreliable and irrelevant basis to sentence any defendant, specifically Mr. Moosman with
this factual record. R.74:36; see also OB.8-9,11-12.
Nor, contrary to the state's suggestion, does Mr. Moosman need to point to
"scientific studies" or "case law" to show "the information [the court] relied upon was
irrelevant" or unreliable. SB.13; Moa, 2012 UT 28, ,r 35. The actual record and the facts
of this case establish that relying on something irrelevant like "literature" was an
unreliable basis for sentencing. OB.8-9,11-12; Howell, 707 P.2d at 118 n.2 (a court's
reliance on "misinformation" and information "in making the sentencing determination"
but which is "not reliable," violates due process" (quotations omitted)). The state has not
established how "literature" fits Mr. Moosman or the facts of this case, nor can it as it is
wholly irrelevant to Mr. Moosman's case. See State v. McC/endon, 611 P.2d 728, 729
(Utah 1980) ("[a] sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in
light of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society
which underlie the criminal justice system"); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ,r 34,
31 P.3d 615 (The trial court must exercise its discretion to determine "what punishment
fits both the crime and the offender"). Where "[t]he sentencing philosophy of the criminal
7

law is that the punishment should not only fit the crime but the defendant as well," and
"[i]t is essential that fairness in sentencing both be perceived as such by the public and
the defendant and, in fact, be fair," this court abused its sentencing discretion. State v.
Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248-49 (Utah 1980); see also OB.6 (quoting Wanosik, 2001 UT

App 241, ,i 34 (our courts "have consistently sought to shore up the soundness and
reliability of the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that
sentencing discretion").
For the reasons set forth herein and in the opening brief, this court should hold that
the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. Moosman to prison, where that
sentence was unfair and based on unreliable and irrelevant infonnation.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Moosman respectfully requests that this Court reverse his sentence and order a
new sentencing hearing.
~

SUBMITTED this

/ 2...

day of April, 2016.

ANNA E. LANDAU
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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